AN OVERVIEW OVER THE CENTURIES OF JUDICIAL POWER'S PROGRESSIVE STRENGTHENING.
The classical topic of transforming the notion of the frame of state (i.e. the vertical relationship between governors and citizens) seems able to affect the different (but related) issue of the institutional balance, in a horizontal perspective, within the constitutional powers of the State (i.e. legislative, executive and judiciary branches).
In particular, it is possible to see in the change from the nineteenth century liberal State to the present post-modern globalized governance passing through the affirmation of the post war welfare societies, a corresponding gradual strengthening of the role of judicial power.
It is well known that the "minimal" State of the nineteenth century was characterised, with regard to the horizontal division of powers, by the absolute predominance of the Parliament over the executive and the judiciary branches, which were considered as ancillary powers of the popular sovereignty's representative body 1 . This Parliament hegemony found its expression, in relation to the sources of law hierarchy, in the absolute predominance of the "legal rule" which, according to a pure "rule of law" logic, was prevailing also over the constitutional (flexible) documents.
With specific regard to judicial power, it considered, in the very lucky
Montesquieu metaphor 2 , not more than the "bouche de la loi". It is well known that this expression tended to accentuate the element of pure and mechanical logic in judicial decision making, while neglecting, or concealing, the voluntary and discretionary element of choice. It is for this main reason that in the historical period under scrutiny, judicial power could be defined, only apparently paradoxically, as a "not power", because of the circumstance that it was not expected to express its own will but only to apply clear and precise rules defined by the legislative power.
In the twentieth century, with the affirmation of the social state, it is widely recognized that the executive power has taken the place of the Parliament in the leading role of modern welfare societies.
The welfare state, in fact, by nature, cannot simply exercise traditional repressive functions or restrict itself to guarantee negative liberties but it must, on the contrary, ensure an active and promotional protection to the citizens.
Such a policy involves by definition planning for future developments and affirming broadly formulated social aims and principles, leaving the courts with the task of concretising, in real life cases, the meaning, extension and limits of these aims and principles.
It is evident that this kind of legislation has encouraged the creativity of judges and the freedom of choice 3 and the significant growth of state intervention in 2 Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois, 1758. 3 It was not a coincidence that, at the beginning of XX century, in parallel with the above named change in the institutional balance between the State's constitutional powers, was born a cultural and juridical movement called "revolt against the formalism" which, against the excessive legalism of the post-codification era, argued that deciding a case could not consist of subsuming certain facts under subsuming rule of law. According to this view, the decision itself will add to the interpretation to the rule to be applied and may thus help to define its meaning. See Geny, Méthode d'interpretation et sources en droit privé positif , Paris, 1899.
fields previously left to private self regulation has led to a corresponding increase in judicial activity 4 .
More precisely, in the social State, through a process of "judicialization" of politics, the distance between institutions and citizens has become narrower and the occasions of exchange of views between the same actors more frequent. The role of the Court, in this context, can be characterized as a privileged meeting place 5 .
Concluding this very brief overview, it seems evident that in the actual era of legal and economical globalization, the classical constitutional governance is changing those characteristics which marked its development process in previous centuries.
In particular it seems to be in a definitive decline that historical constellation characterised for the contextual presence, within the same national borders, of the State, sovereignty and economy triangle 6 .
The post modern constitutionalism is rather marked by a process of sovereignty's fragmentation followed by a parallel process of its re-articulation within a multilevel and polycentric order.
In this scenario, it is decisive to find out the right and quickest interconnection routes in order to connect the different constitutional centres which frame, at national, supranational and international level, the new polycentric global order.
It is a common opinion that judicial decisions' multilevel network is the best interconnection route 7 . The "road to juristocracy" consequently represents one of the main trends of the post-modern constitutionalism in the judicial globalisation era 8 .
In other (more convincing) words, 'judicial power has moved from being the "weak ring" of the chain to become the strong one' 9 .
Judge-made law seems to be in a better position than legislative or administrative acts, in terms of flexibility and its pragmatic approach, to face the challenge of legal systems as they become increasingly more interdependent and are in a constant and unforeseen transformation.
To put it blandly: the global governance seems to prefer the language of the "law in action" than the ink of the "law in the books" 10 .
judicial globalisation 11 , the European judiciary DNA.
To put it simply, when the discussion about the global expansion of judicial power comes across the European Court of Justice's case law, it is taken as example in order to show how the common law wind of USA Supreme Court is now blowing also on Luxemburg 12 . In other words, through the emerging role of the Judicature in the "old continent", it would be progressively developing a gradual "americanization" of European constitutional law 13 .
Against this view it is worth emphasizing that the analysis of the European experience related to our topic constitutes a interesting field of research not only because it represents a meaningful expression of judicial globalization trend, but also (and perhaps mainly) because, within this scenario, it seems able to constitute a specific model of expansion of the judicial power.
In particular, the specificity of European judicature finds its roots in substantial and structural reasons, the first connected with the system of legal values
proper of the European dimension, the second related to the specific DNA characterising the European legal order.
With regard to the substantial reasons, if it is true that the Luxembourg Court has created a constitutional doctrine by a common law method 14 , it must be clearly underlined that the above named doctrine remains purely European.
This means that through this methodology and by referring explicitly and implicitly to the common constitutional traditions of the member States, the ECJ In other words and for those who like rhetoric: an independent judicial island in the ocean of the judicial globalisation.
In relation to the structural reasons, two are the elements which seem to make unique the architecture of the European legal order: the principle of evolving dynamism and the principle of constitutional tolerance.
THE PRINCIPLE OF EVOLVING DYNAMISM AND THE

TELEOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH.
The first element 15 is characterised by the process of slow but constant transformation of the European humus, which characterised, at the beginning, in 1957, by an evident market oriented goal, has incorporated, during the years, a social and a political dimension.
This transformation process has been driven by the courageous activism of the Court of Justice, which, in an often embarrassing inertia of the European community legislative power, has taken on the "job of constitutionalising" the EC Treaty.
As, in a well known piece, Stein wrote: 'tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with the benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe' 16 .
It would have been inconceivable to bring about such a radical transformation without applying a degree of judicial creativity.
Of course, every conquest has its price, and the ECJ has had to pay the price of no longer being subject to 'benign neglect' but becoming, on the contrary, the target of harsh accusations 17 and the beneficiary of valiant defences 18 for the way in which it has interpreted its judicial function.
More precisely the European judges had the role, especially in the early years, to fill up the void left by the legislative branch. As Kutscher 19 has explained, the inactivity of the legislature compelled the Courts to decide questions and solve problems which should be dealt with by the legislature, i.e. the Council and the Commission, and to a lesser degree also the European Parliament.
In particular, the well known European democratic deficit -where the role of representative bodies in the legislative process is hard to define and where, more generally, the link between voters' wishes and political decisions has become extremely tenuous -confers a legitimate character upon judicial creativity which courts lack in developed democratic system 20 .
To put it differently, it can be underlined that the creative and activist role of the The principle of evolving dynamism at the heart of the European legal orderand the consequent special role interpreted by the Court of Justice as the engine of the European integration process -has been also fostered by the wording of the Treaty of Rome.
The EC Treaty, in fact, is not to be seen as a list of conquests already made but, rather, as a programme to be realised progressively over time. In other words, it must be underlined that the congenital vocation of the Treaty, moreover typical of constitutional charters, of being both an act and a work in progress.
It is then obvious that the nature of the Treaties encourages creative law making.
There are two reasons for this:
Firstly, because they are the products of a compromise between States which may share ultimate goals but still represent different economic, social, political and legislative backgrounds and may hold strongly divergent views on specific policy areas. The choice between the two can only be governed by policy consideration" 30 .
In order to apply the principle of evolving dynamism, the favourite method of interpretation of the ECJ has always been the teleological one, which seeks to interpret a rule by taking into account the purpose, aim and objective it pursues.
This kind of purposive approach was clearly declared by the Court of Justice in the CILFIT case, where it affirmed that "every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of E.C. law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied" 31 .
The teleological method of interpretation is perfectly consistent with the dynamic and evolving nature of the European Community, which over the years has changed its objectives and its plans from a purely economic approach to a broader system of values which affects social and environmental issues, and the protection of human rights. Consequently, the Court has to reinterpret and to adapt the original meaning of the Treaty provisions in accordance with the new values and aims that are becoming part of the European dimension.
In the light of these considerations, the question which should be asked, when examining an ECJ decision, is not whether law has been applied or created, but rather what the Community's telos is. This is a difficult question to answer 32 See Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law Oxford, 1999,4. 33 In doctrinal debate we often come across the conviction that a clear distinction exists between legal interpretation and judicial activism. According to this distinction, the former is considered a legitimate expression of judicial function and the latter its degeneration, involving a judge's arbitrary intrusion into the political arena by giving priority to values other than legal ones, such as, in the case of the ECJ, supporting the process of European integration. It must be emphasised that the aforementioned conviction is misplaced, being based on an old and reductive concept of judicial function, whereby the judge was seen as an inanimate, robot-like By applying the principle of tolerance to the European judicature mechanisms, it is evident that the European Court of Justice, unlike the American Supreme
Court and the European Constitutional Courts, has almost no powers that do not ultimately derive from its own prestige or the intellectual and moral force of its opinions 35 and, in particular, it cannot count on a constitutional discipline which forces the member States to obey to its decisions. The obedience of the member States is then purely voluntary and the Court is paying an incredible amount of attention to fostering this "miraculous" attitude of constitutional tolerance.
spokesman of the law. This concept confirms the idea that by purely deductive logic the judge could ascertain the law without personal responsibility or creative means. By contrast, it must be underlined that judicial function involves per se not only the interpretation of law but also its creation. If one accepts this fundamental observation, there is no clear distinction between legal analysis or interpretation on the one hand and judicial law-making on the other. In fact both of them, far from belonging to different spheres, the former legal and the latter political, fall within the boundaries of legitimate judicial function. 34 the principle of evolving dynamism and the necessity to respect the principle of constitutional tolerance, were forced to invent a complex judicial strategy in order to pursue the teleological spirit of the EC Treaty without abusing the constitutional tolerance shown by the member States.
Alternatively put, the ECJ had to find a compromise between two judicial routes going towards two opposite directions.
On the one hand, in the light of principle of evolving dynamism, it has had to follow the judicial route addressed to pursue an activist and often creative teleological hermeneutical approach, in order to adapt the original economic vocation of the EC Treaty to the non-economic priorities emerging in the European dimension over the years.
On the other hand, in the light of the principle of constitutional tolerance, the European judges could not have allowed themselves to forget the judicial selfrestraint route which has always prevented them from being too intrusive towards the member States' constitutional legal orders, in order to not overstep the threshold of tolerability beyond which the principle of constitutional tolerance can change in his opposite (dark) side: the expression of the national constitutional arrogance.
THE FIRST-LEVEL STRATEGY: THE ART OF JUDICIAL PERSUASION.
The "compromise" judicial journey has been concretised by ECJ in a double level argumentative strategy: a first level approach addressed to the national judges, a second one addressed to the legislative and executive bodies of the Member states. In relation to the first level of the above named strategy addressed to the national judges, the Court of Justice has emphasised the importance of persuasion in judicial discourse.
In particular the European judges have developed, by applying a didactic methodology to their legal reasoning, "a judicial style which explains as declares the law" 36 . This is particularly true with specific reference to the procedure of art.
234 EC. It was not easy for the ECJ to induce the national judges to feel confident towards such new and sophisticated "judicial conversation tool" but, during years of "courteous pedagogy" ( 37 ) it has managed to persuade them.
It has been due to the trust so obtained that the European judges have been able to build with a national judges an exceptionally cooperative, and sometimes accomplice, judicial dialogue.
According to many scholars, this process has contributed to transforming the To this regard, it should not be forgotten that the national courts have followed the instructions from Luxembourg even when these instructions have been against their constitutional mandate.
It is enough to remind here of the Simmenthal case 41 "the culmination of the principle of direct effect and supremacy, in which the ECJ held the Italian courts simply had to defy Italian constitutional rules to the Corte costituzionale" 42 .
As a brief conclusion, the judicial style of European judges has been sufficiently convincing if it persuaded the national judges to accept European Court of Justice requests even when the acceptance has meant a radical departure from their respective national constitutions.
THE SECOND-LEVEL STRATEGY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACTORS OF MEMBER STATES AS INTERLOCUTORS. A CASE STUDY IN THE FIELD OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SEXUAL
MINORITIES.
In relation to the member States' possible reactions, the Court of Justice has increased sensitivity towards the limits of its judicial activism. In particular the Court has always been attentive to the potential impact of its decisions on the national legal, political and social orders of the Member states.
One of the defining parameters in this effect-oriented analysis seems to be the so called majoritarian activist approach 43 , according to which among the different possible solutions of a case, the European judges are going to choose the final ruling which is likely to meet with the highest degree of consensus in the majority of the member States. The key to the apparent enigma is found by reflecting upon the impact that a decision can have on the national legal systems by the application of the majoritarian activism approach, as it is proved by the following case law analysis of two decisions in the field of protection of sexual minorities.
It is a convenient preliminary matter to establish a methodological three-step test to apply to the case law which will be examined. The applicant in the main proceedings was dismissed from his employment following his decision to undergo gender reassignment. The question referred to the Court was whether the equal treatment directive precludes dismissal of a transsexual for reasons related to gender reassignment.
B) GRANT.
The Court had to decide whether discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation fell within the scope of sex discrimination. In this case, the applicant, a female lesbian employee, argued that she was the victim of sex discrimination because she was refused certain travel concessions by her employer, which had been available to her predecessor for his cohabitant of the opposite sex on the grounds that her cohabitant was of the same sex.
THE COURT'S DECISION AND ITS LEGAL REASONING: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE APPROPRIATE COMPARATOR.
A) P v. S AND THE MANIPULATIONS OF COMMUNITY LEGISLATION.
It is probable the force of the opinion of AG Tesauro had a great influence on Concerning, first of all, the analysis of the legislative measure under discussion, the Court was aware that the directive did not literally and specifically address the problem of the adverse treatment of transsexuals and was not literally and specifically intended to do so. Consequently, the ECJ did not refer to the 46 P v. S, at 2157.
original intention of the legislator but focused instead on the spirit and scheme of the directive, 47 concentrating on three different concepts, namely the principle of equal treatment for men and women, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex, and the principle of equality. The emphasis on the latter was the key element in the decision.
The Court, regarding the principle of equality as being fundamental in EC law, was in fact able to transcend the provisions of Community legislation and manipulate the directive's meaning in order to extend its scope to apply to discrimination arising from the gender reassignment of the person concerned.
The second innovative judicial approach in the case is related to the human rights issue. In fact, usually, when the Court has been called on to take into particular consideration the issue of human rights in interpreting the facts of a case, it has always taken a cautious approach, by first ascertaining the applicability of EC Law to the facts.
By contrast in P v. S, "the reasoning of the Court quite literally overturns its earlier prospective on this point" 48 . In fact, the Court reversed this standard test to determine if a human rights matter fell within its jurisdiction. Thus the Court began its reasoning by affirming that "the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of sex is one of the fundamental human rights whose observance the Court has the duty to ensure" 49 .
The European judges continued by affirming that the non-discrimination principle is to be extended to transsexuals.
Finally, by the clear manipulation of a secondary legislative measure, the ECJ concluded that the scope of a directive must be read in the light of this principle. 47 It is a typical formula which indicates the Court's will to adopt a teleological interpretative approach. 48 Flynn, Case Note on P.v.S. and Cornwall Council, in Common Market L. Rev., 1997, 384. 49 P v.S,, at par 19.
It was an innovative reasoning compared to the traditional approach, which would have consisted in looking first at the scope of the directive and then examining how the principle of equality applied within its scope.
The third aspect of judicial creativity in this case concerns the consideration, in the Court's reasoning, of a different kind of comparator in contrast to the traditional approach. In this context, the UK government added, applying the Aristotelian concept of equality 50 that, in this case, no discrimination was involved because a female-to-male transsexual would have been treated in exactly the same way as the applicant.
The ECJ, however, had little sympathy for this argument, adopting instead as the appropriate comparator the pre-transsexual persona 51 . In fact, the European judges underlined that "where a person is dismissed on the grounds that he or she intends to undergo, or has undergone, gender reassignment, he or she is treated unfavourably by comparison with persons of the sex to which he or she was deemed to belong before undergoing gender reassignment" 52 .
This means the comparison was made between the condition before and after gender reassignment surgery. Following this reasoning, the Court departed from the traditional comparison between a male and female heterosexual. Such reasoning undermined the hegemony of heterosexual paradigm, which until then implicitly underpinned the sexual equality principle 53 .
However, the Court did not stop here; instead it moved from an approach, based on an Aristotelian notion of equality according to which like should be treated alike to a broader, more substantive, concept of equality, affirming that "to tolerate such discrimination would be tantamount, as regards such a person, It is clear how the Court, by "breaking with the past", viewed the principle of equality as a general principle of EC law which transcends the provisions of Community legislation
B) GRANT: A "CREATIVE" SELF-RESTRAINT?
The Court adopted a self-restraint approach, affirming that sexual orientation did not represent grounds for sex discrimination. By adopting this approach, the Court, nevertheless, showed a high degree of judicial creativity 55 .
This will be seen this by underlining two aspects of the case which are, in our opinion, a good example of judicial law-making: the choice of a relevant comparator and the manipulative reading of the outcome in P v. S.
Concerning the first element, Mrs Grant had advanced two closely related arguments: first of all, that the refusal constituted discrimination directly based on sex and secondly, that discrimination based on sex included discrimination against sexual orientation.
The only way for the Court to accept these arguments would have been to apply a comparison between homosexuals and heterosexuals -in casu between a female homosexual (Mrs Grant) and a male heterosexual (her predecessor).
Basically, this would have meant applying the traditional non-discrimination formula that consists in changing the sex of the person concerned while keeping all other circumstances constant.
54 P. v.S, at par. 22. 55 See below conclusive remarks.
By contrast, the Court decided that the condition, the effect of which is that the worker must live in a stable relationship with a person of the opposite sex in order to benefit from the travel concessions is, like the other alternative conditions prescribed in the undertaking's regulations, applied regardless of the sex of the worker concerned, Consequently, it rejected, in this case, the existence of sex discrimination, affirming "that travel concessions are refused to a male worker if he is living with a person of the same sex, just as they are to a female worker if she is living with a person of the same sex" 56 .
It is clear that, in the application of non-discrimination formula, the Court changed not only the sex of the person concerned, but also the sex of her partner. It is clear that this reasoning is based on a comparison between homosexual suggesting an adherence to the heterosexual paradigm. Grant is compared with a male homosexual, concluding that in both cases they would suffer an «equal misery».
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Robert Wintemute has questioned this kind of reasoning. He underlined that "this comparison avoids a finding of direct sex discrimination by changing not only the sex of the women, but also of her partner. Yet for a valid sex discrimination analysis, the comparison must change only the sex of the complaining individual, and must hold all other circumstances constant" 58 .
The author has concluded that, because an individual's sexual orientation can only be defined by reference to their sex, distinction based on sexual orientation necessarily also involves distinction based on the sexes of the individuals concerned. The basis for categorising a woman as lesbian is that she is attracted to women, in the same way that the basis for categorizing a man as heterosexual is that he is attracted to women. So, where a woman is penalized for being attracted to women but a man is not, the only difference between the two is their sex.
Concerning the second aspect of judicial creativity, it must be underlined that, after the innovative approach in P v. S, there was great interest in the possible outcome of Grant, and many scholars 59 expected that the Court would conclude that sexual orientation could also be prohibited as sex discrimination.
The AG Elmer also saw this as an appropriate decision, affirming that "there is nothing in either the EU Treaty or the EC Treaty to indicate that the rights and duties which result from the EC Treaty, including the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of gender, should not apply to homosexuals, to the handicapped, to persons of a particular ethnic origin or to persons holding particular religious views. Equality before the law is a fundamental principle in every community governed by the rule of law and accordingly in the Community as well. The rights and the duties which result from Community law apply to all without discrimination and therefore also to…. (those) citizens of the Community…who are homosexuals".
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Besides, the Court in P v. S declared that "to tolerate transsexual's discrimination would be, as regards such a person, a failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to safeguard" 61 .
Why should these considerations not be valid for homosexuals? Are they Another reason to believe that in Grant the Court would have followed the substantial notion of equality highlighted in P v. S was that, as Trevor Hartley in a broader context has observed, "a common tactic by the Court is to introduce a new doctrine gradually: in the first case that comes before it, it will establish the doctrine as a general principle, and if there are not too many protests, it will be reaffirmed in later cases: the qualifications can then be whittled away and the whole of the doctrine revealed" 62 .
The Court did, however, exactly the opposite. It applied, without further explanations, the P v. S reasoning to transsexuals but not to lesbians and gay men, when the two groups appeared, using the P v. S reasoning, to be similarity situated.
Despite the temptation to explain immediately the reason for this different approach, it is more consistent with the general test established above to investigate the legal reasoning that allowed the Court of Justice to depart from the statements made in P .v S.
First of all ECJ interpreted narrowly the notion of sex, referred to in para. 21 of P v. S, 63 as biological and a purely physical concept. Following this interpretation, it is possible to assume that in Grant the Court deducted that the statements in P v S were confined to cover only transsexuality as a biological phenomenon. This means that the Court considered a person's search for a more integrated identity by undergoing medical treatment to adapt his physical characteristics to his psychological nature as a medical problem. Consequently, being a medical issue, transsexuality falls within the narrow notion of sex as a biological matter. 62 Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, 1998, 78. 63 Where the Court affirms that the transsexual's discrimination is based on the sex of the person concerned.
By contrast, in Grant, the Court considered the issue of homosexuality as outside the biological limits of its notion of sex, implying the perception of this concept more as an exercise of free will rather than a medical notion 64 .
The second judicial creative source that the Court used to depart from P v S was the "opportunistic" reference to the law of the European Convention on Human Rights. Unlike the case of P v. S, where the Court was quite prepared to disregard the negative jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights on transsexuals, the ECJ in Grant placed great weight on the fact that the E.C.H.R.
held that homosexual couples do not constitute a family for the purposes of Article 8 regarding the right to respect for family life.
Moreover, the Court added that the very case law of the E.C.H.R considered that giving more favourable treatment to married and unmarried opposite sex couples than to same sex couples was compatible with the principle of nondiscrimination expressed in Article 14 of the Convention 65 .
As was foreseeable, this restrictive interpretation of P. v S., was the target of several adverse criticisms regarding the Court's approach of "creative" selfrestraint.
Concerning the narrow conception of the notion of sex, it has been affirmed that the unfavourable outcome in Grant suggests "an unwillingness of the Court to bridge the gap between sex (transsexuality) and gender (homosexuality), stressing that this was a lost opportunity to apply a broader notion of sex equality, which includes the more dynamic sociological dimension of gender 66 .
In relation to the reference to the law of the European Convention of Human Keeping in mind these peculiarities of the European legal system, it is possible to identify some factors which can help us to understand the reasons for the apparently schizophrenic approach of the Court.
First of all, there is an important difference in the "challenge" which transsexuals offer to social norms compared with lesbian and gay men. As it was brilliantly underlined: "transsexuals effectively ask to be treated as the woman (or man)
that they consider themselves to be, and whose external physical features they effectively possess after surgery and hormonal treatment. They move from belonging to one sex to the other but do not call into dispute the social roles and the expectations imposed on men or women as such. By contrast, for many people lesbians and gay men offer a more fundamental challenge to the social meaning assigned to what it is to be a 'woman' or a 'man' precisely because they do not wish in any way to be less of a woman or man by reason of their sexual orientation" 69 .
Secondly, transsexuals formed in Europe, at the moment of the court's ruling, a small group, whose number AG Tesauro tried to quantify: "one male every 30,000 and one female every 100,000 have the intention of changing sex by surgery". In the same period of reference, the number of homosexuals in While it is true, as AG Elmer underlined, that the prohibition of discriminations on the ground of sex must be kept free from the moral conceptions present in the Member States, it is however also true that the duty of the Court is also that of considering the degree of consensus that a decision may obtain in relation to The Court gave a reply which was as concise as it was peremptory to these questions: "in those circumstances, it is for the legislature alone to adopt, if appropriate, measures which may affect that position" 72 .
There is another element in the Court's decision that is helpful to understand why the judicial outcome was due to deference of the Member States. 
A DOUBLE GROUND CONCLUSIVE REMARKS.
From the analysis carried on thus far it is possible to draw up a double ground of conclusive remarks.
The first level is "legal reasoning oriented", aimed to clarify the relationship between judicial activism's notion and the judicial technique used by the Court of Justice.
The second level could instead be defined as "content oriented", and it is finalised to propose an alternative instrument finalised to uniform the European social policy in the member States.
1. In relation to the legal reasoning argument, the creative self restraint approach in Grant can contribute to unmask the commonly-held view according to which judicial creativity should only be present in activist or pro-integration decisions of the Court of Justice and not in those cases where the European judges decide to remain within the boundaries of its case law by adopting a selfrestraint approach.
The named commonly held view, which is inconsistent with a comprehensive analysis of the judicial law-making process, is the consequence of an overlap of two different and autonomous legal concepts.
It should be in fact differentiated, on one hand, the decision's final ruling and, on the other hand, the legal reasoning through which the same final result is achieved by the court.
The decision's final ruling can be either "progressist", by taking another step further along the European integration process, either conservative, by remaining wisely within the boundaries of previous case law. In both cases the evaluation of the activism or self restraint approach in the final judgment must be distinguished by the evaluation of the legal reasoning on which the court's final judgment is founded.
Only by keeping in mind this distinction it is possible to realize that a legal reasoning characterising a decision which is clearly marked by a self-restraint final result (as in Grant) can be more creative than a reasoning which is able to bring, as in P v S, to an activist final judgment.
The above finding is only apparently paradoxical. To a deeper analysis there are indeed elements which allow to identify a larger space of creativity and originality in the judicial techniques leading to a self restraint conservative final ruling than in the legal reasoning which is functional to an activist progressist final judgment . To this regard, the starting point is the awareness of the architectural asymmetry between the achievement of European common market and the development of a European social dimension, or, to put it differently, between the negative and positive integration 76 .
It is well known that, at least in the first generation of European economic It is obvious that a similar judicial approach in relation to the achievement of a European positive integration is simply unthinkable. Not only because in the social matters the member States keep in defending bravely the last national sovereignty's fragments, but especially because in order to build a social regulative framework the judicial pars destruens must concur, by nature, with a normative pars costruens which can be only legislative based. It is evident that, with regard to this second part, the European community needs the active support and the effective cooperation of the member States' legislative bodies, because of the simple fact it (still) has in re ipsa neither the competence nor the budget to adopt, at a centralised level, an efficient social policy of redistribution.
The second conceptual step consists realising the structural limits and the overall failure of the European normative attempt to harmonise the social policy in the member States' legal systems 79 .
In relation to its limits, it is manifest that the European vocation to harmonise the social national policies could not go, within the narrow boundaries of its competences, beyond the imposition, on member States' legislative institutions, of European directives transposition duties in their respective national legal systems. The only weapon in the European hands in order pursue a social harmonisation is than a legal tool of hexogen and external pressure on member State legislation.
With regard to its failure, it is well known that the harmonisation attempt of national legislations in the field of social policy which was largely completed in the nineties did not bring about the desired results and, for this reason, since 2000 80 , it has substantially put aside in favour of an alternative and overvalued social policy regulative instrument: the wrongly celebrated OMC 81 .
After having become aware of, on the one hand, the structural limits and comprehensive failure of the social policy harmonisation trial and, on the other hand, the unimproved effects of its substitute OMC, it is then possible, in the light of the results of the case law analysis carried out, to enucleate an alternative source in order to foster a European social dimension.
national legislations, the European Court of Justice, in the light of the majoritarian activism approach, would not have declared it void.
This means that in order to avoid a dangerous regulative insulation which can easily become the target of the majoritarian activism approach, the national social legislators are in a way forced to individualise common European social standards by looking beyond their national regulative model of social policy.
Such mutual observation and influence's mechanism seems able to bring to a process of progressive convergence of the national social policies.
The added value of this process would be its endogen nature 82 and its consequent better possibilities to reach the hoped results with respect to the above described hexogen and not satisfying attempts of achieving a European social policy. 
